Governors must be elected

Governors must be elected Under the influence of alcohol, a mischievous youth sarcastically asked; “if a governor is renting someone's house, does it suggest the person is being governed by his or her landlord in a region s/he governs?” Analyzed closely, the story was aimed at capturing, positioning and winning public opinion on the matter of governors' supposedly poor conditions of service.

To start with, word from treasury is that governors' remuneration is similar, if not exactly equivalent to that of deputy ministers. You are correct in wondering why deputy ministers aren't renting. How is it possible that nurses and teachers, whose salaries are probably four times smaller than those of governors, can afford houses? Be reminded that in February 2013 about 239 politicians (governors included) benefited from a 15% salary increase. What is the way forward if the governors' self-actualisation moan is dismissed as dishonest? To answer that, we must shift the debate from their material aspirations to the challenges in local authorities of which “the status of governors” is one. The genesis of problems of local authorities can be understood from the seemingly unresolved dichotomy of the policy of decentralisation, on the one hand, and the unitary principle of the state on the other. In Article 1, our Constitution establishes our republic as a democratic and unitary state whose main organs are the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, while providing the basis for decentralisation in Chapter 12. Decentralisation, therefore, has to take place in observation of the dictums of both Chapter 12 and Article 1.

The architecture of the Regional Councils Act 22 of 1992 somehow harmonised the decentralisation policy and the unitary state principle. Where problems remained, the Decentralisation Enabling Act, Act 33 of 2000 was roped in to regulate the decentralisation to encompass regional and local authority councils vis-à-vis functions vested in line ministries. It is the Second Regional Councils Amendment Act, Acy 16 of 2010 - read together with the Special Advisors and Regional Governors Appointment Amendment Act, Act 15 of 2010 - that caused the serious problems that we wish to discuss today. Five key problems can be identified. These are (1) Democratic deficit; (2) Alienation of the general will; (3) No legal basis of effective governance; (4) Encroachment and lack of legitimacy; and (5) Eyes-hands-accountability dichotomy.

While the Regional Councils Act, Act 22 of 1992 makes provision for members of the regional council (consisting of elected councilors) to democratically elect among themselves a person to serve as chairperson and governor of that respective region – the Special Advisors and Regional Governors Appointment Amendment Act, Act 15 of 2010 takes away this democratic practice exporting it solely to the President. This then creates a democratic deficit. Governors are the only high ranking political office bearers not subject to any form of the people's will. Councilors are elected; the President is also directly elected, not forgetting the mere fact that ministers are firstly elected into parliament, thus making governors the only officials not subject to popular public choice.

The Second Regional Councils Amendment Act, though giving some rights to appointed governors to attend the meetings of the regional council, legally discriminates and victimises governors by taking away their voting powers in these meetings, in so doing, birthing an effective governance quagmire. There exists a dilemma of encroachment and legitimacy.

Most government officials have clear reporting structures from themselves – through directors, the line ministers and eventually the President. It is unclear as to where appointed governors, who are viewed as a duplication of reporting structures, or encroaching thereon and lacking legal legitimacy, fit. Further to this, it is for this reason that some governors, after receiving cold shoulders, resort to intimidation and bullying tactics; sometimes it works, but sometimes it doesn't. Consider the case of a state-owned enterprise board of directors summoned by the appointed governor to explain their operations (which the governor disagrees with). Their operations are approved by their line minister (also appointed by the President). The governor informs them that he/she is the President's representative while the board responds that their operations are approved by their line minister – to whom they report.

Imagine what would happen should serious differences develop between the regional council chairperson and the governor. Wouldn't the governor be isolated? Governors are regarded, some proclaim, as 'the eyes and ears” of the President in the regions. They indirectly admit that someone else exists in the region, not them, who are the hands of the President – theirs is to see and listen. The governors themselves openly proclaim that they are accountable, not to people, but to the Commander-in-Chief.



*Abraham Vincent Kamati is a final year student teacher at the University of Namibia. He also serves as a Speaker of Student Parliament for all UNAM Campuses.